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[L. A. No. 22941. In Bank. Apr. 15,.1955.] 
RALPH N. HIGHSMITH et al., Plaintiffs, v. 'MAX LAm 
et al., Defendants; MORTON D. GOLDBERG et al., 
Respondents; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Ap-
pellant. 
[la,lb] Internal Revenue-Federal Tax Lien.s.-Although by its 
tax liens federal government acquires interest as coowner of 
indebtedness of judgment debtor to taxpayer, its rights are 
not greater than those of taxpayer wbose property is sought 
to be levied on, nor greater than those which would be ac-
quired by assignee of taxpayer. 
[1] Federal tax liens, note, 105 A.L.R. 1244. See also Am.Jur., 
Internal Revenue, § 76 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Referen.ces: [1, 5, 6] Internal Revenue; [2) Judg-
ments, §§ 521, 534; [3, 4] Judgments, § 527. 
D 
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[2] Judgments - Setoff - Effect ot' Assignment.-A judgment 
debtor who has by assignment or otherwise become owner of 
judgment against his judgment creditor may go into court in 
which judgment against him was rendered and have his judg-
ment offset against creditor's judgment. 
[3] Id-Setoff-Setoff of Claim Against Judgment.-Under Code 
Civ. Proc., § 368, judgment debtor may set off claims against 
creditor which were acquired after assignment of judgment 
to third person but prior to notice to debtor of assignment. 
[4] Id.-Setoff-Setoff of Claim Against Judgment.-Actual notice 
of assignment is necessary to defeat right of judgment debtor 
to set off claims against creditor which were acquired after 
assignment of judgment to third person. 
[5] Internal Revenue-Federal Tax Liens.-Right of setoff may 
not be ignored in determining effect of federal tax liens on 
claims against a debtor, and state law is controlling in de-
termination of such rights. 
[6] ld.-Federal Tax Liens.-Where debtors against whom tax-
payer obtained judgment have no notice of federal govern-
ment's tax liens at time they acquire judgments against tax-
payer, such judgments are properly set off against one in tax-
payer's favor, and because of such setoffs there is no property 
in such judgment debtors' possession against which tax liens 
may be foreclosed, and no cause of act.ion against them for 
personal judgment in favor of federal government. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief, in which some defendants file 
cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment for cross-com-
plainant Goldbergs and for cross-defendant Califurnia De-
partment of Employment, affirmed. 
Laughlin E. Waters, United States AttlJrney, and Edward 
R. McHale, Assistant United States Attorney, for Appellant. 
Maurice Rose for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J .-The question here presented for decision 
concerns the scope and effect of notices of tax lien of the 
United States of America. The appeal is from a judgment 
holding that the federal government may not recover from 
[2] Setoff as between judgments, note, 121 A.L.R. 478. See also 
Oal.Jur., Judgments, § 269 et seq.; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 898 
et seq. 
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the judgment debtors of the taxpayer the amount stated in 
those notices til b~ due for unpaid taxes, and also that it 
has no right to money on deposit with the municipaJ court. 
Max Lair sued Morton and Katherine Goldberg for money 
assertedly due him upon a contract. After the commencement 
of the action, but before Lair obtained judgment for approxi-
mately $4,000, the government filed its notices of tax lien. 
Subsequently, and before they received actual notice of these 
liens, the Goldbergs acquired, in the name of H. Markus. 
four judgments against Lair evidencing a total indebtedness 
by him of about $4,200. 
Levies were made by each of Lair's judgment creditors, 
or his assignee, upon the indebtedness evidenced by the judg-
ment against the Goldbcrgs. 'rhe State also levied upon this 
indebtedness claiming that Lair was delinquent in the pay-
ment of taxes. The GolUbergs then deposited $4,200 with the 
marshal of the municipal court to the credit of Markus. This 
deposit was made under an agreement between the Gold-
bergs and Markus whereby he was to collect the amount of it 
from the marshal, less execution fees, and pay the balance 
to them. In the present action the trial court found that the 
Goldbergs made this deposit "in order to have the record 
manifest their set-offs of their acquired four judgments 
against said judgment in favor of Max Lair." Subsequently, 
upon the motion of the Goldbergs, Lair's judgment against 
them was satisfied of record. 
The deposit is being held by the marshal pursuant to an 
order of the court obtained by the plaintiffs in the present 
suit who are alleged creditors of Lair. The prayer of the 
complaint was for a money judgment against him, and a 
declaration of the priorities of liens upon, and conflicting 
claims to, the indebtedness represented by the judgment ob-
tained by Lair against the Goldbergs. 
By cross-complaint, the Goldbergs named the United States 
of America as a cross-defendant. In its answer, the govern-
ment asserted that it has first liens on the property of Lair. 
It asked the court to enforce those liens upon any of Lair's 
property held by GolUberg and, in particular, upon the de-
posit with the marshal. By way of cross-complaint against 
the Goldbergs, the government demanded a personal judgment 
against them. Only the government has appealed from the 
judgment which declared, inter alia, that the government 
never acquired any interest in the debt due from the Gold-
bergs to Lair, denied it the right to recover any amount 
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against the Goldbergs and ordered that its cross-complaint be 
dismissed. 
The United States claims that after the notices of tax liens 
were recorded, it had an interest in the Goldberg's debt to 
Lair which could not be divested by any act of the debtors. 
'!'he Goldbergs contend that the United States has no interest 
in the deposit because the government's liens could only 
extend to property of Lair. It is their position that the de-
posit was made to satisfy claims against Lair, and he had no 
interest in it at any time. They also argue that the govern-
ment is not entitled to a persona] judgment against them 
because of their right of setoff against Lair and they had no 
property belonging to him in their possession at the time of 
the government's demand. Another point relied upon is that, 
if the court erred in applying the principle of setoff, under 
the rule of res judicata, the government is bound by the 
order satisfying the judgment in Lair v. Goldberg. Finally, 
they insist that no personal judgment can be rendered against 
them under the provisions of section 3710(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, because, at the time of the government's de-
mand, any property of Lair which . they had in their pos-
session had been levied upon by other creditors. 
The Internal Revenue Code provides that if any person 
liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same 
after demand, the amount, including any interest or penalty, 
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property 
and rights to property, belonging to such person. (26 U.S.C., 
1946 ed., § 3670.) The lien shall not be valid as against any 
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until 
notice thereof has been duly filed in the office of the county 
recorder of the county within which the property subject 
to the lien is situated. (26 U.S.C., 1940 ed., 1953 Pocket 
Supp., § 3672 (a) (1); Cal. Gov. Code, § 27330.) 
In the event of the nonpayment of the amount of taxes 
claimed, the collector may levy upon all property and rights 
to property (with certain exceptions not here pertinent) 
belonging to such person, or on which the lien provided in 
section 3670 exists, for the payment of the sum due. (26 
U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 3692.) 
Sectio.D 3710 of the Internal Revenue Code reads: "Any 
person in possession of property, or rights to property, sub-
ject to distraint, upon which a levy has been made, shall, 
upon demand by the collector or deputy collector making such 
levy, surrender such property or rights to such collector or 
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deputy, unless such property or right is, at the time of such 
demand, subject to an attachment or execution under any 
judicial process. 
"Any person who fails or refuses to so surrender any 
of such property or rights shall be lia.ble in his own person 
and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the value 
of the property or rights not so surrendered, but not ex-
ceeding the amount of the taxes (including penalties and 
interest) for the collection of which such levy has been made, 
together with costs and interest from the date of such levy." 
(26 U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 3710.) 
[la] Although by its liens the government acquired an 
interest as coowner of the indebtedness of Goldberg to Lair 
(United States v. Oity of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963), its rights 
are not greater than those of the taxpayer whose property 
is sought to be levied upon. (United States v. Winnett, 165 
F.2d 149, 151; accord: Karno-Smith 00. v. Maloney, 112 
F.2d 690, 692; United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, 321.) 
" 'The proposition here laid down is in harmony with the 
generally recognized principle that the rights of the garnisher 
do not rise above, or extent beyond, those of his debtor; 
that the garnishee shall not, by operation of the proceedings 
against him, be placed in any worse condition than he would 
have been in, had the principal debtor's claim been enforced 
against him directly; that the liability, legal and equitable, 
of the garnishee to the principal debtor, is a measure of his 
liability to the attaching creditor, who takes the shoes of the 
principal debtor, and can assert only the rights of the latter.' 
•.. It would be most unfair that a third person, merely by 
reason of his interposition, whether he was a sovereign or 
not, should be able to change the rights inter sese between the 
obligor of the chose in action and his obligee, who is the objec-
tive of the levy or attachment." (United States v. Bank of 
United States, 5 F.Supp. 942, 945.) 
[2] In California, "a judgment debtor who has, by assign-
ment or otherwise, become the owner of a judgment or claim 
against his judgment creditor, may go into the court in which 
the judgment against him was rendered and have his judg-
ment offset against the first judgment. . . . [3] Under section 
368 of the Code of Civil Procedure l the debtor may set off 
ICode of Civil Procedure section 368: "In the case of an assignment 
of a thing in action, the action by the assignee is without prejudice to 
any set-off, or other defense existing at the time of, or before, notice of 
the assignment; ••• " 
) 
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claims against the creditor which were acquired after the 
assignment of the judgment to a third person but prior to 
notice to the debtor of the assignment. . . . [T] here is no 
room for the exercise of discretion upon this question." 
(Harrison v. Adams, 20 Ca1.2d 646, 649 [128 P.2d 9] ; also 
see: Haskins v. Jordan, 123 Cal. 157 [55 P. 786].) [4] Actual 
notice is necessary to defeat this right. (See McCabe v. 
Grey, 20 Cal. 509.) [lb] The rights acquired by the govern-
ment as coowner of the debt never were greater than those 
which would have been acquired by an assignee of Lair. 
In United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F.2d 538, the 
government brought an action for penalties against the bank 
for refusal to surrender $3,500. the amount of the deposit 
of one Toler, a delinquent taxpayer. The government had as-
sessed Toler for income taxes in March. In June, the Col-
lector served upon the bank a notice of lien for the taxes 
and a warrant of distress, claiming thereby to have levied on 
the deposit of Toler. Just prior to the levy, Toler, to meet 
the claims of creditors, borrowed $10,000 from the bank, 
giving a mortgage on his plantation. 
When Toler was unable to settle with his creditors, he 
and the bank agreed that, from the proceeds of the loan, he 
would pay the bank $6,500, the amount due to it upon his 
past due unsecured notes in its favor. The remaining $3,500 
was credited to his account. It was held that the bank had a 
clear right to offset the $3,500 against the $10,000 note. At 
the time of the levy, said the court, "there was no property 
or right to property of Toler which Toler could assert and 
consequently nothing which the tax could take a lien on or 
the tax officer could rightfully demand possession of." (P. 
539.) The fact that the $10,000 note and the $3,500 deposit 
both stemmed from the same transaction was discussed, but 
was not considered to be the controlling factor in the case. 
The government cites United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 
149, and United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, as sup-
porting its position. In the first case, the court upheld the 
right of setoff which Winnett obtained prior to the date the 
lien was claimed. The decision does not bar a right of setoff 
which is obtained before actual notice of tax lien, but after 
the lien is recorded. In the Graham case, no consideration 
was given to the statutes and decisions relating to rights of 
setoff. In that case, the lien of the federal government was 
upheld solely upon the basis of its rights against the taxpayer. 
[5] The right of setoff may not be ignored in determining the 
) 
) 
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effect of tax liens on the claims against a debtor and the state 
law is controlling in a determination of those rights. (Karno-
Smith 00. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, 692.) 
[6] The Goldbergs had no notice of the federal government's 
liens at the time they acquired the judgments against Lair, 
and those judgments were properly setoff against the one in 
favor of Lair. Because of those setoffs there is no property 
in the possession of the Goldbergs against which the tax liens 
may be foreclosed, and no cause of action against them for a 
personal judgment. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to 
discuss other defenses against the claims of the United States. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
On February 8, 1950, Lair brought an action against the 
Goldbergs and on March 26, 1951, he secured a judgment for 
$4,144.22. In the meantime, on April 13, 1950, and July 26, 
1950, the United States filed notices of tax liens against Lair 
in Los Angeles County. Thereafter the Goldbergs purchased 
three judgments against Lair and another claim against him 
that was subsequently reduced to judgment. None of these 
judgments were entered, however, until after the notices of 
the tax liens were filed. Had Lair's creditors sought to enforce 
their claims against Lair instead of selling them to the Gold-
bergs, they could not have reached Lair's claim against the 
Goldbergs until the tax liens had been satisfied. (United 
States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-51 [71 
8.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53]; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 
[75 S.Ct. 239, 99 L.Ed. --]; United States v. Liverpool & 
Londo'll &7 Globe Ins. 00., 348 U.S. 215 [75 S.Ct. 247, 99 
L.Ed. --].) In such case, the United States would have 
been free to enforce its liens against Lair's property by col-
lecting the judgment in his favor against the Goldbergs. 
The question presented, therefore, is whether the Goldbergs 
can defeat this right of the United States by purchasing claims 
against Lair that but for the purchase would be subordinate 
to the tax liens. In my opinion, they cannot do so. 
It is true that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge 
of the tax liens at the time they purchased the claims against 
Lair and that in the absence of federal legislation their right 
to setoff would not be prejudiced by an assignment without 
notice of the judgment against them. (Harrison v. Adamr, 
...... 
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20 Ca1.2d 646, 649 [128 P.2d 9]; Code Civ. Proc., § 368.) 
It bears emphasis, however, that the Goldbergs did not pay 
their judgment creditor without notice of the tax liens against 
him. Instead, they purchased claims against th~ir creditor 
that were subordinate, whether they knew it or not, to the 
tax liens, and there is no reason why these claims should have 
greater value against the United States in the Goldbergs' 
hands than they had in the hands of the Goldbergs' assignors. 
Citing Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, United 
States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149, United States v. Bank of 
Shelby, 68 F.2d 538, United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 
318, and United States v. Bank of United States, 5 F.Supp. 
42, the majority opinion holds, however, that the right to 
setoff must be determined by state law and that the Goldbergs 
may not be placed in a worse position toward their creditor 
because the United States has intervened. The cited cases 
considered situations in which the right to setoff arose before 
the tax liens were perfected or in which the delinquent tax-
payer at no time held an enforcible claim against his alleged 
debtor. It is settled, however, that once the tax lien has been 
perfected it may not be displaced by operation of state law 
(Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340 [63 8.Ct. 302, 
87 L.Ed. 312]; United States v. City of New Britain, 347 
U.S. 81, 84 [74 8.Ct. 367, 98 L.Ed. 520]; United States v. 
Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214 [13 8.Ct. 846, 37 L.Ed. 705]) and 
that the interests of the United States may not be prejudiced 
by the assertion of subsequently acquired rights of third 
parties against the tax delinquent. (United States v. Security 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-53 [71 8.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 
53]; Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267-
268 [66 S.Ct. 108, 90 L.Ed. 56]; United States v. City of 
Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965; Miller v. Bank of America, 166 
F.2d 415, 417 i Citizens State Bank of Barstow v. Vidal, 114 
F.2d 380, 383-384; In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F.2d 455, 
457; United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, 321, affirmed, 
195 F.2d 530; United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F.Supp. 433, 
436.) 
The fact that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge 
. of the tax liens when they purchased the claims against Lair 
does not render the enforcement of the tax liens against them 
inequitable. The Goldbergs' indebtedness to Lair was an asset 
that the United States was entitled to levy upon for the pay-
ment of taxes due. As noted above, the Goldbergs did not 
pay the judgment in ignorance of the tax liens but instead 
) 
) 
purchased claims against Lair. That the value of these claims 
was problematical was apparent from the fact that Lair'B 
creditors were willing to sell them for approximately one 
third of their face value and the Goldbergs could easily have 
determined from an examination of the records that they 
were subordinate to the tax liens. Under these circumstances 
it cannot reasonably be said that the United States attempted 
to prejudice the Goldbergs' position toward their creditor 
by asserting its tax liens. Instead, because they failed to in-
vestigate the sources of information available to them, the 
Goldbergs have been permitted to succeed in defeating the 
enforcement of the tax liens by advancing claims that were 
subordinate to them. 
Gibson, O. J., concurred. 
